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Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance
KEVIN DOWD
Department of Economics
University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract
This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an
agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire
such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and
equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided
the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and
incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.
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1. Introduction
Despite its major shortcomings as revealed in recent years, most economists still believe that
government deposit insurance has a useful role to play in promoting the stability of the
banking industry. This belief goes back to the view that banking is ‘‘inherently’’ unstable, so
government support is needed to reassure depositors who otherwise would be prone to run on
their banks. The seminal statement of this view is by Diamond and Dybvig (DD; 1983), who
built a model that, with various modifications, has since become standard.1 In their model,
agents face individual liquidity risk, but aggregate liquidity needs (at least partially) are
predictable. Agents therefore form an intermediary to pool their liquidity risks. However,
this arrangement has a problem: The agents who do not need liquidity might ‘‘panic’’ and
demand payment prematurely, in which case the intermediary would face a damaging run.
DD suggest that this outcome could be avoided if the government provided those agents with
a guarantee (which DD interpret as a form of deposit insurance) that they would be paid in
full. Agents then would have no reason to run and the intermediary would be safe.
This paper presents a stylized version of the DD model that calls into question this
conventional view of banking instability and deposit insurance.2 The paper addresses a
shortcoming of the DD analysis, which models intermediaries as having only one source of
finance, making the DD intermediaries more like mutual funds than banks. Indeed, these
DD intermediaries are odd even as mutual funds, since the nominal value of their liabilities
is fixed, yet they have no capital to absorb any shocks to their portfolios and thus maintain
their ability to honor their deposits in full.
There also is a serious problem with the analysis itself. The proportion of agents who
face positive liquidity shocks, t, needs to be stochastic to make the analysis interesting.
However, if t is stochastic, the DD intermediary will not know the actual value of t until all
the agents who want to withdraw early have already done so, in which case, presumably it
is too late to make payments conditional on the realized value of t. The obvious alternative
is to make payments conditional on expected t, but in this case, the DD intermediary would
have total liabilities that exceed its total assets whenever the actual value of t exceeds its
expected value. The mere possibility that this might occur then undermines the
intermediary’s ability to provide credible insurance. The problem is not so much that
the DD intermediary faces instability, as DD themselves suggest, but that it has no clear
reason to exist in the first place.
An alternative involves bringing some other agent(s) into the model to provide liquidity
insurance. If the new agents know that they face no consumption risk, then under plausible
circumstances they will offer the DD depositors insurance against their own individual
liquidity risk in return for adequate premiums. They provide insurance by setting up their
own financial intermediary. This intermediary would issue demand deposits to the other
agents, while issuing a residual claim, equity, to the new agents. The intermediary
therefore resembles a real-world bank financed by both deposits and equity. Furthermore,
provided it has enough equity, it can guarantee all its deposits against default risk. My
model thus formalizes the notion of bank capital adequacy, while also suggesting that
banking without deposit insurance is more stable than the DD model would suggest.3
2. Diamond and Dybvig reconsidered
2.1. A stylized Diamond and Dybvig intermediary with no aggregate consumption risk
Suppose initially that we have a large number of identical individuals, each of whom lives
for three periods, 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, each individual is endowed with a unit of a good
and decides how to invest it. This person faces an investment technology that for each unit
invested in period 0, yields 1 unit of output in period 1 or, if left till then, R41 units of
output in period 2. When period 1 arrives, each agent receives a signal telling the period in
which he or she wants (or will want) to consume, with some (the type I agents) wishing to
consume only in period 1 and the others (the type II agents) wishing to consume only in
period 2. The type Is therefore will liquidate and consume all the proceeds of their
investment in period 1, but the type IIs have to decide whether to retain their initial
investments until period 2 or liquidate their investments in period 1 and keep the proceeds
until the next period. Storage from one period to another is costless and unobservable. An
agent’s type is not publicly observable, but the proportion of type I agents, t, initially is
assumed to be fixed and known. I also follow Wallace (1988, p. 9) and assume that agents
are isolated from each other in period 1, in the sense that those who collect their returns in
period 1 do so at random instants during that period.4
Each agent maximizes the expected utility function:
EftUc1  1ÿ tUc2g 1
where c1 is consumption in the first period and c2 is consumption in the second period.
Since the type Is would consume only in period 1 and the type IIs would consume only in
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period 2, c1 and c2 also can be regarded as the consumption of type I and type II agents,
respectively. To make the analysis explicit, U ?  is assumed to take the following form:
Uci  ci1ÿ g=1ÿ g 2
where i equals 1 or 2, and g41.5 U ?  thus exhibits constant relative risk aversion and has
a risk aversion coefficient greater than 1. Agents seek to maximize their utility subject to
the resource constraint
tc1  1ÿ tc2=R  1 3
which tells us how total consumption is limited by agents’ initial investments and returns
in each of the two periods (see also DD, 1983, p. 407).
One option is for agents to live in autarky. If they do, our assumptions about
endowments and investment technology imply that the type Is would consume 1 unit and
have ex post utility U1  1=1ÿ g and the type IIs would consume R units and have ex
post utility UR  R1ÿ g=1ÿ g. Ex ante (i.e., in period 0), an agent living autarkically
therefore would expect the utility
tU1  1ÿ tUR  t=1ÿ g  1ÿ tR1ÿ g=1ÿ g 4
However, since agents are risk averse, they would value an opportunity to insure
themselves in period 0 against the ‘‘unlucky’’ event of turning out to be type I. Given that
the proportion of type Is, t, is known in advance, it ought to be possible for our agents to
come to some arrangement to diversify this risk among themselves. Assuming it can be
arranged costlessly, the optimal insurance arrangement is found by maximizing (1) subject
to (2) and the resource constraint (3). The optimal consumption levels in periods 1 and 2
then can be found from (3) and the first-order condition
U0c1=U0c2  R 5
which tells us that, in any optimum, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
levels in the two periods should equal the marginal rate of transformation, R. The optimum
consumption levels turn out to be
c1  Rgÿ 1=g=1ÿ t tRgÿ 1=g; c2  R=1ÿ t tRgÿ 1=g 6
where
15c15c25R 7
The optimal insurance arrangement thus leads type I agents to have higher consumption
than they would have obtained under autarky, while the type II agents get less than they
would have under autarky; however, the type Is still end up with less than the type IIs
because period-1 consumption has a higher opportunity cost (see also DD, 1983, p. 407).
One way to provide this insurance is for agents to form a financial intermediary in
period 0. Instead of investing their endowments in their backyards, agents would deposit
them with the intermediary, and the intermediary would invest them on their behalf. When
agents’ types are revealed in period 1, the intermediary would pay out more to those
withdrawing in period 1 than the one unit they would have received had they invested
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autarkically, with the remainder being paid out to those who withdraw in period 2, who
would get less than the R they would have received under autarky. This solution also
satisfies a self-selection constraint (i.e., it induces type Is to withdraw (only) in period 1,
and type IIs to withdraw (only) in period 2). No type I agent would ever wish to keep a
deposit until period 2, because he or she benefits only from consumption in period 1. At the
same time, no type II agent would withdraw prematurely, because the return from
premature withdrawal would be less than the return from withdrawing later.
This intermediary also operates in period 1 under a sequential service constraint (i.e., it
deals with requests for redemption in period 1 in a random order, until it runs out of assets).
This constraint arises because of agents’ isolation in period 1: Since agents collect their
returns at random times within period 1, the intermediary must deal with their requests for
redemption ‘‘separately, one after the other’’ (Wallace, 1988, p. 4). It follows, naturally,
that any suggested arrangements must be consistent with the sequential service constraint.
2.2. The stylized Diamond and Dybvig intermediary in the presence of aggregate
consumption risk
Unfortunately, the DD arrangement is not robust to uncertainty about t. Suppose we now
assume that t is, say, a uniform random variable that can take any value between 0 and 1
with equal probability. The uncertainty about t means that contractual payments cannot
now be made conditional on the realized value of t because (a) the sequential service
constraint requires that depositors must be dealt with sequentially, and (b) the realization
of t cannot be known until all period 1 withdrawals have been completed. The
intermediary does not know what to pay each depositor until they have all gone and it is
too late to do anything about it. Consequently, it is not possible to condition any insurance
arrangement on the realized value of t.
Suppose, then, that our intermediary were to offer agents insurance contracts along
earlier lines, but with payments now conditional on te (which is equal to 0.5) rather than t:
c1  Rgÿ 1=g=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g; c2  R=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g 8
Using (8) rather than (6) to determine payouts, the intermediary would pay out tc1 to
agents withdrawing in period 1, leaving 1ÿ tc1 at the end of the period. It then would
make a gross return of 1ÿ tc1R in period 2, from which it would have to pay out
1ÿ tc2 to those withdrawing that period. A little manipulation then shows that its net
profit is
P  Rtÿ te1ÿ Rgÿ 1=g=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g 9
Since Rgÿ 1=g41, the net profit is positive if t5te and negative if t4te.
But a new problem now becomes apparent: If t4te, the intermediary’s promised
payments exceed the return on its investments, and the intermediary cannot make its
contractual payments—and this means that it cannot offer credible insurance. (By contrast,
the intermediary could offer credible insurance before, precisely because t was
deterministic: The deterministic t meant that the intermediary knew its future payments
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and knew that it could make them.) A type II depositor cannot now be confident of the
promised return from waiting until period 2 to redeem the deposit and so may rationally
decide to ‘‘play it safe’’ by redeeming the deposit in period 1 and keeping it under the
mattress until he or she consumes it in period 2. In other words, the self-selection
constraint no longer holds, and type II investors may rationally decide to run on the
intermediary in period 1. Indeed, if agents expect the type II agents to run in period 1, they
would have no reason to leave deposits with the intermediary in the first place.6
The DD solution is for an outside party, the government, to guarantee the intermediary’s
payments to those withdrawing in period 2 (DD, 1983, pp. 413–416). Type II agents then
would have no reason to run, the self-selection constraint would be satisfied, and the
intermediary could provide optimal insurance. However, this ‘‘solution’’ is not feasible if
we take investors’ isolation seriously: If the deposit insurance guarantee is to work, the
government must credibly promise that depositors who keep their deposits till period 2
will get repaid in full. Yet, the only available resources are those the intermediary has
already paid out to agents who have withdrawn in period 1, and the government can get
access to these resources only if it has some means of overcoming the sequential service
constraint, which in turn implies that the government has the means to overcome the
period-1 isolation that gives rise to this constraint in the first place. If we take the isolation
assumption seriously, the government has no way of providing credible deposit
insurance—and the DD solution is not feasible (see also, e.g., Wallace, 1988).7
3. A ‘‘real-world’’ bank
A more fruitful approach is to consider another way for investors to obtain the insurance
they want. If depositors cannot provide such insurance themselves, the obvious alternative
is for some other agents to provide it. Suppose, then, that we add a third type of agent to
our model, a type III agent. This new agent is endowed with an amount K for each
depositor and differs from them by already knowing in period 0 that he or she will want to
consume (only) in period 2. (This latter condition makes it easier for the type III agent to
commit to postponing consumption until period 2.) This person, too, has the option of
investing in the backyard and, by doing so, knows that he or she would get a return of KR
(per depositor) in period 2. The issues involved are seen most easily if we initially suppose
that the type III agent is risk neutral, but I relax this assumption later.
The question is whether a type III agent would wish to use the endowment to provide
aggregate consumption insurance to the other agents. To answer this question, we need to
establish whether the agent could charge an insurance premium p for these services that
would be high enough to induce that person to sell insurance, but low enough to make it
worth their while for the other agents to buy insurance from him or her.
3.1. A risk-neutral type III agent
The analysis is very straightforward if our type III agent is risk neutral. Suppose the agent
sets up a bank and offers investors the same optimum returns as earlier, minus a charge p.
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(We assume for convenience that this charge is deducted from the deposit repayment.) The
agent’s return in period 2 would be the sum of the return on his or her own capital, KR, the
same net profitP we had earlier, and the charge p. Given that (9) implies that the expected
value of P is 0, a risk-neutral banker would choose to set up a bank—that is, choose the
uncertain return KRP p over the certain return KR—for any positive value of p.
Any inducement, however small, will lead our type III agent to set up a bank.
3.2. A risk-averse type III agent
What happens if the type III agent has the same aversion to risk as the other agents? In this
case, it is easy to show that, by setting up the bank, the type III agent accepts a gamble on
the realization of t, the expected utility from which is
EU 
Z t 1
t 0
ptUKRPt  pdt 10
Assuming that t is distributed uniformly over the interval 0, 1, we substitute (9) into (10)
and rearrange to obtain
EU  1=1ÿ g
Z t 1
t 0
a bt1ÿ gdt 11
where:
a  KR pÿ teR1ÿ Rgÿ 1=g=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g 12a
b  R1ÿ Rgÿ 1=g=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g 12b
We then integrate (11) and obtain
EU  a b2ÿ g ÿ a2ÿ g=b1ÿ g2ÿ g 13
For the agent to accept the gamble and establish the bank, the expected utility in (13) must
exceed the person’s autarky utility level KR1ÿ g=1ÿ g. Some numerical simulations
then suggest that, provided the type III agent has sufficient capital,8 there always exist
values of p that would make the depositors and the type III agent better off with a bank
than under autarky.9 A bank always would be in everyone’s interest, provided the type III
agent has enough capital.
3.3. Capital adequacy
The analysis thus far presupposes that the bank is able to guarantee its promised payments,
and we need to check that this is the case. To guarantee its payments, the bank must have
enough capital to cover its losses in the worst-case scenario. The worst-case scenario in
our model is where every depositor decides to redeem in period 1. Given that the bank
would have to pay out c1 to each depositor who withdraws in period 1, but would make a
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return of only 1 on each such deposit, the worst possible loss the bank could face is c1 ÿ 1
per depositor. The bank therefore can guarantee all its commitments only if the type III
agent’s capital per depositor, K, is at least as great as this maximum possible loss:
K  c1 ÿ 1  Rgÿ 1=g=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g ÿ 1
 Rgÿ 1=g ÿ 11ÿ te=1ÿ te  teRgÿ 1=g 14
Equation (14) gives us a capital adequacy condition (see also Dowd, 1993, p. 366) or
Eichberger and Milne, 1990, p. 19). Provided the bank’s capital satisfies (14), the bank
always can meet its commitments and depositors can be fully confident of being repaid.10
The bank’s contracts then are fully credible and there is no reason for a type II agent ever
to run. Even if a type II agent expected all other agents to redeem in period 1, it still would
be rational to wait until period 2 because the return would be higher. He would therefore
wait. Other type IIs are just like this one, so they would wait as well. A run therefore would
never occur, and the only agents who would redeem in period 1 are the type I agents who
should redeem in that period anyway.
4. Conclusions
An intermediated arrangement is feasible in a DD-like environment, provided one or more
additional agents are able and willing to commit the resources needed to ensure that the
intermediary can honor its obligations. This intermediary would be similar to a real-world
bank and would issue demand deposits, which would be redeemable on demand and fixed
in nominal value, and a residual claim, held by the type III agent(s), which would be
similar to real-world bank equity. By contrast, the DD model predicts the existence of a
peculiar type of mutual organization that we seldom observe in the real world but does not
predict the existence of banks as such. It therefore cannot provide a rationale for real-world
banking regulation or government deposit insurance.11
My model also explains the function of bank capital—bank capital is a device to give
depositors rational confidence in the bank. This explains why bankers traditionally have
placed so much emphasis on bank capital, an emphasis that makes no sense in traditional
DD models, which deal only with mutual institutions. My model also suggests that there
need be no bank stability problem provided a bank has sufficient capital. It therefore is not
surprising that banks are the dominant form of intermediary and that intermediaries like
the DD one rarely, if ever, arise.
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Notes
1. For some perspectives on the Diamond-Dybvig literature, see, e.g., Chant (1992), Selgin (1993), or the
survey in Dowd (1992).
2. The model is a stylized version of the DD model. It is based on theirs to facilitate comparison but differs in
two significant ways: It assumes a more explicit utility function to derive clearer results and it invokes
Wallace’s ‘‘isolation’’ assumption to provide an underpinning for the sequential service constraint on which
the existence of financial intermediation depends in this sort of environment. See also note 4.
3. This paper is not the first to question the DD rationale for deposit insurance, but previous papers, I believe,
are less satisfactory. The first of these, Dowd (1988, 1993) is somewhat informal, and the other, Eichberger
and Milne (1990), has a less desirable motivation for the existence of financial intermediaries than the
present paper—it motivates them by assuming that small agents lack access to the investment technology—
as well as a less complete treatment of the banker’s optimization problem. It also has very little to say about
the internal consistency of the DD model or deposit insurance, both of which are major themes of this paper.
4. This ‘‘isolation assumption’’ serves two functions: (1) It provides a ‘‘friction’’ in the economic
environment that gives an intermediary an advantage over a credit market in period 1 (see, e.g., Jacklin,
1987; Wallace, 1988, p. 9). Without it, or something similar, the outcome obtainable by an intermediary also
can be obtained by the credit market. There then would be no reason for agents to prefer an intermediary
and therefore no reason to suppose that one would arise. (2) The isolation assumption provides a motivation
for the sequential service constraint that plays an important role in the DD analysis but that DD assume
rather than derive (DD, 1983, p. 408; see also Wallace, 1988, p. 3). This is important because the sequential
service constraint turns out to be inconsistent with DD government deposit guarantee (see Wallace, 1988,
pp. 3–4: and pp. 11 in this paper).
5. It also is necessary to impose the condition that c= 2 to ensure that (13) later is determinate.
6. If investors leave deposits with the intermediary and the type IIs run, the average depositor will get an
uncertain return of mean 1: Those who get there first get more than one unit each, and those who get there
later get nothing. The average investor’s implied expected utility then is less than the expected utility under
autarky. If agents expect the type IIs to run, they would be better off investing autarkically and the
intermediary would attract no depositors.
7. An alternative discussed in the DD literature is for the intermediary to suspend payments in certain
circumstances (see, e.g., Jacklin, 1987, or Selgin, 1993). The knowledge that the intermediary can or would
suspend payments then might reassure depositors that it was not about to run out of resources and so
discourage a run from starting. I prefer to focus only on the way in which equity capital can discourage runs,
in order to keep the paper as simple as possible, but exploring the relative merits of suspension clauses and
equity capital as reassurance devices would be an interesting extension.
8. The explanation is that, as the capital rises, the type III agent becomes less absolutely risk averse and
therefore more willing to take the risk; consequently, if capital is high enough, the type III agent always can
be induced to become a banker at a price (i.e., premium) that the other agents are willing to pay.
9. Spreadsheet results also suggest that the amount of capital required can be high and usually is considerably
more than is required to guarantee that the bank always can pay its depositors in full. To give an example, if
R  2 and g  1:5, then a premium of p  0:01 is sufficient to make a bank worthwhile for everyone, but
only provided the type III agent has around 0.7 units of capital for each depositor (i.e., provided the bank
can satisfy a 70% capital-assets ratio).
10. The minimum adequate level of capital varies with the input parameters, but spreadsheet simulations
suggest it usually is well under half of the amount the type III agent needs to be induced to become a banker.
For example, if R  2 and g  1:5, as in the last note, the minimum adequate capital ratio is 11.5%.
11. There is no room for welfare-improving government intervention in this model. There are three possible
cases to consider, depending on the amount of capital the type III agent has. (a) If the capital is high enough
to induce our type III agent to become a banker and make that bank capital-adequate, then our economic
problem is solved and there is nothing the government can do to improve social welfare. (b) If the agent’s
capital is insufficient to induce that person to become a banker but more than enough to meet our capital
adequacy condition (14), then the government can set up its own bank and use the type III agent’s resources
to capitalize it and guarantee deposit repayments. However, this makes the type III agent worse off than
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under autarky, so this arrangement is not Pareto-superior to autarky. (c) Finally, if the type III agent lacks
enough capital to satisfy (14), there is not enough capital for anyone to establish a capital-adequate (i.e.,
safe) bank, and a guarantee—governmental or otherwise—is impossible. Government intervention is
redundant in the first case, fails the Pareto efficiency test in the second case, and is not feasible in the third.
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